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ECONOMIC PRESSURE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
LOCKOUT AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS IN
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
PETER H. CARROLL, III

Labor disputes are as old as organized society. One of the central purposes of the National Labor Relations Act of 19351 (NLRA) was to offset
the superior power of employers in collective bargaining with the utilization of strikes and other types of economic pressure by employees.2 Accordingly, section 7 of the Act was drafted to protect the use of economic
pressure by both labor organizations and unorganized employees,' while
section 8 sought to prohibit an employer's response to such pressure in the
form of disciplinary action.4 The Act contemplates a balance between two
conflicting policy arguments which represent, on the one hand, the policy
prohibiting management from reprimanding its employees for the application of economic pressure, and on the other, the policy allowing an employer to protect his economic interests for legitimate business reasons.'
While the courts traditionally have prohibited certain forms of economic
pressure by employees,' the ability of employers to utilize economic pressure has been expanded by recent cases.' In light of the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB, I however, it is apparent that the extent to which an employer can use lockouts and permanent
replacements is currently an important and unresolved question affecting
the balance of economic power in labor relations? In order to understand
1. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). When the National Industrial Recovery Act
was declared unconstitutional, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created
pursuant to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. This Act, popularly
known as the Wagner Act, was subsequently amended by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and
the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. See generally 1 J. JENKINS, LABoa LAW § 2.2, at 55 (1968).
2. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)). "The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of belief that the
conflicting interests of management and worker can be adjusted only by private negotiations,
backed, if necessary, by economic weapons, without the intervention of law." Cox, The Right
to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 322 (1951).
3. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)).
4. See id. § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
5. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1196 (1967).

6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492-94 (1960) (slowdown); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 261 (1939) (sitdown strike);
NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 1944) (wildcat or unauthorized strike).
7. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1965); NLRB V.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 285 (1965); Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).

8. 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977).
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the problem adequately, it is necessary to review the history and development of protected concerted activity, and the judicial tests which have
been applied to determine the legality of management's reaction to such
pressure.
PROTECTED CONCERTED AcTIVITY

Common Law Origins
At common law, a concerted withholding of services by employees for
higher wages or better working conditions was deemed a criminal conspiracy.1 Although American courts adopted the common law doctrine in early
decisions," in 1842 the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision of
Commonwealth v. Hunt rejected the notion that an association of employees was unlawful per se.' 3 Subsequently, workmen were allowed to
unite for the purpose of improving their terms of employment. Certain
concerted activities, however, remained illegal and were held to be actionable in tort on grounds of intentional infliction of harm." Legality of concerted action depended upon the nature of the conduct and the object to
which the conduct was directed. 6 Hence, a labor union could implement
various forms of concerted action, such as the strike or picket, to pursue
an objective closely aligned to a justifiable interest of organized labor. An
9. See id. at 1134 n.18.
10. See, e.g., Locust Club v. Hotel & Club Employees Local 568, 155 A.2d 27, 33 (Pa.
1959); Cote v. Murphy, 28 A. 190, 191 (Pa. 1894); Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72, 76 (Wash.
1965) (en banc). "The common law judges saw no connection between the absence of labor
organizations designed to improve the pay and working conditions and the loathsome conditions in which the industrial workingman and his family lived." Id. at 77.
11. See 2 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 4.1, at 1, 3 (1976).
12. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
13. Id. at 134; see Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1128, 1149-50
(1932); Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 825 (1926). "Since
Commonwealth v. Hunt . . . any serious claim that a labor union constituted a criminal
conspiracy vanished from the legal scene and has never revived." Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d
72, 78 (Wash. 1965) (en banc).
14. See Robinson v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 782, 207 P. 132, 134 (Idaho
1922); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 124 N.E. 97, 100 (N.Y. 1919).
15. See, e.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205-06 (1904); Blue Boar Cafeteria Co.
v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Local 181, 254 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Ky.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 834 (1953); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077-78 (Mass.
1896); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 34 N.E.2d 349, 352 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615
(1941).
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 775, Comment a at 97-98 (1939). Section 775 provides:
Workers are privileged intentionally to cause harm to another by concerted action
if the object and the means of their concerted action are proper; they are subject to
liability to the other for harm so caused if either the object or the means of their
concerted action is improper.
Id. § 775; see Fenske Bros., Inc. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Local 18, 193 N.E. 112, 116 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
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intentional injury or damage of an employer's business, however, could be
enjoined or could render the union liable for damages. 7
Federal Preemption
Since 1935, the NLRA has preempted much state statutory and common
law regulating labor disputes where interstate commerce is affected." Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection,"' 9 while sections 8(a)(1) and (3) make it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to attempt to stifle such activities through interference or
discrimination.20 Concerted activities protected by section 7 clearly include
the right to strike, to picket peacefully, and to boycott for purposes and
by methods not prohibited by section 8.1 Today, if management repri17. James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329, 333-34 (Cal. 1944); Roraback v. Motion
Picture Mach. Operator's Local 219, 168 N.W. 766, 766 (Minn. 1918); see, e.g., Fashioncraft
v. Halpern, 48 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. 1943) (peaceful picketing in furtherance of unlawful strike
for closed shop enjoined); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1900) (coercion of
incumbent union and employer by members of ousted union enjoined); O'Neil v. Behanna,
37 A. 843, 844 (Pa. 1897) (strikers liable in damages to employer for unlawful intimidation of
replacement employees).
18. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 59 (1966); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958). See also Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic:
Labor Law Preemptionand Individual Rights, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1037 (1973); Comment, Preemption in Labor Relations, 35 TExAS L. REV. 555 (1957).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). This section provides: "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (3) (1970). This section provides, in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title; . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
Id. Among the excellent articles dealing generally with "concerted activities" are the following: Cox, The Right to Engage in ConcertedActivities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951); Getman, The
Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967); Schatzki, Some Observationsand Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 378 (1969).
21. See Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 390 (1951); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1950). Section 7 does
not protect all activity, as, for example, strikes conducted in an unlawful manner for an
unlawful purpose. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492-94
(1960) (slowdown); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 261 (1939) (sitdown
strike); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 1944) (wildcat or unauthorized
strike). Strikes for illegal objectives include jurisdictional strikes, hot cargo disputes, second-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 1, Art. 10

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:179

mands its workers for participating in activities protected by section 7, it
violates section 8(a)(1), and it also violates section 8(a)(3) if such activity
is in conjunction with union organization." An employer, however, is not
without recourse. When confronted with the exercise of protected rights,
management, acting to protect its business, can respond legitimately with
economic pressure to minimize concerted employee activity.
THE

Mackay Doctrine-Replacement of Striking Employees

Although the right to strike is not included in the United States Constitution,"4 it is expressly guaranteed under the National Labor Relations
Act. 5 Strikes fall essentially into two categories: An unfair labor practice
strike is one that is caused, at least in part, by an employer's unfair labor
practice;" while an economic strike is initiated by a union for the purpose
ary recognitional strikes, secondary boycotts, and featherbedding. See 7 FEDERAL REGULATION
OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICE § 56.37, at 21 (1977).
22. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1198 (1967). Absent a showing of antiunion animus,
an employer is free to discharge an employee for any reason. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1937); NLRB v. Meinholdt Mfg., Inc., 451 F.2d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1971). An employer may
not, however, intimidate or coerce employees in the exercise of their organizational rights and
punish them for engaging in protected concerted activity. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379
U.S. 21, 23 (1964); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,16-17 (1962); see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
23. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1965) (employer may
use lockout in support of legitimate bargaining position after impasse); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (employer may hire permanent replacements
in order to continue operations during economic strike); cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (employer may prohibit distribution of union literature on company
property). See also Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1199 (1967).
24. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) (right to strike is not protected under
fourteenth amendment); 7 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 29.02, at 29-5 (1975); cf. American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (right to strike is lawful
instrument in lawful economic struggle); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (right to strike possesses constitutional and common law underpinnings).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). This section provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except
as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that
right." Id. As used in the NLRA, the term "strike" includes "any strike or other concerted
stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption
of operations by employees." 29 U.S.C. § 142(2) (1970). Generally, however, the word "strike"
is construed to mean "a cessation of work by employees, accompanied by picket lines which
in combination impair or prevent production in all of the employer's premises." Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. 9 FEDERAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICE § 68.19, at 16-17 (1977); see NLRB
v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579, 583-84 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960)
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of obtaining higher wages, better working conditions, and reduced hours
from an employer." Unfair labor practice strikers possess an absolute right
of reinstatement upon the termination of a strike, regardless of whether
replacement employees were hired by the employer to enable him to continue business operations during the interim. 8 While economic strikers
may not be discharged during the period of the strike, they ate entitled to
reinstatement at the end of the strike only if they havte not been replaced
permanently.2" As a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 3 an employer possesses the right to hire
permanent replacements for workmen who strike to force compliance with
the union's collective bargaining demands."'
BARGAINING LOCKOUTS AND THE USE OF TEMPORARY REPLACEMENTS

A lockout has been defined as the "temporary withholding of employment in order to serve some interest of the employer vis-d-vis his employ(striking employees entitled to reinstatement due to employer's unfair labor practice in discharging two workers for union activities). For an excellent discussion of the respective rights
of economic and unfair labor practice strikers see Comment, Reconversion of Unfair-LaborPracticeStrikes to Economic Strikes, 64 GEO. L.J. 1143, 1144-47 (1976).
27. See Martin, The Rights of Economic Strikers to Reinstatement: A Search for
Certainty, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 1062, 1063-64 (lawful strikes, not caused or tainted by unfair
labor practices, considered economic). The National Labor Relations Act itself does not
assign different rights to economic and unfair labor practice strikers. See 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
28. E.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1967); Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956); Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1968).
It is a well settled rule that a strike may be an unfair labor practice strike even though it is
also economically motivated, and employees are entitled to reinstatement with back wages
upon its termination. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 356 F.2d 955, 965-66 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 900 (1966); NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 269 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963); NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F.2d 203, 206 (2d Cir.
1944). See also Martin, The Rights of Economic Strikers to Reinstatement: A Search for
Certainty, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 1062, 1064.
29. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); Philip Carey Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964); NLRB v. Thayer
Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954); see Cox, The Right to
Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 319-20 (1951). 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1970)
provides, in part:
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer. . . and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment ..
Consequently, the discharge of an economic striker prior to termination of the strike is
violative of section 7 of the Act. See 7 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 29.02, at 29-8 n.18 (1975).
30. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
31. See id. at 345-46; Comment, Reconversion of Unfair-Labor-PracticeStrikes to Economic Strikes, 64 GEo. L.J. 1143, 1144-47 (1976).
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ees . . .. "I In recent years it has developed into an effective bargaining
weapon for the employer. 3 At common law, the employer could lock out
his employees "at will," 4 unless he had relinquished his right to do so by
an express agreement to the contrary. After studying the legislative histories of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, the United States Supreme
Court, in 1957, affirmed the right of an employer to utilize the lockout as
an economic weapon in certain situations, concluding that it was not unlawful per se.36 Nevertheless, the locking out of employees in order to
frustrate. organizational or recognitional activity has consistently been held
violative of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.37
Prior to 1965, the NLRB had sustained employee lockouts only in cases
involving single-employer economic lockouts that were implemented to
prevent unusual economic losses or complications in operation posed by an
imminent strike,38 and as a defensive measure to preserve a multi-employer
32. Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown
Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193, 194 (1966). At common law, a "lockout" meant an employer's
withdrawal of work from his employees in an attempt to acquire for himself more favorable
conditions of employment. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937); Associated Gen. Contractors, 138 N.L.R.B. 1432, 1442
(1962); Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 282 (1951). Recently the word "lockout"
has been identified with a temporary layoff of employees rather than a termination of the
employee relationship. See Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 583 (7th Cir.
1951); Associated Gen. Contractors, 138 N.L.R.B. 1432, 1442 (1962). See also Comment,
Lockouts and Replacements in Bargaining-Managementon the Offensive, 9 Lov. L.A.L.
REV. 67, 67 n.1 (1975).
33. See Comment, Lockouts and Replacements in Bargaining-Managementon the
Offensive, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 67, 68-69 (1975).
34. See Iron Molders Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 50 (7th Cir. 1908).
35. See, e.g., Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 292 N.Y.S. 898, 903 (App. Div. 1936)
(injunction against illegal lockout and removal of plant contrary to agreement between employer and union); Goldman v. Cohen, 227 N.Y.S. 311, 313 (App. Div. 1928) (lockout of
employees because of union membership enjoined); Moran v. Lasette, 223 N.Y.S. 283, 286
(App. Div. 1927) (right to lockout is corollary of union's right to strike, unless relinquished
by agreement between parties).
36. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1957); see Bernhardt,
Lockouts: An Analysis of Board and Court Decisions Since Brown and American Ship, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 211, 213 (1972).
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stremel, 141 F.2d 317, 318 (10th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Mall Tool
Co., 119 F.2d 700, 701 (7th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652,
657 (9th Cir. 1939). The Board has the burden of proving by substantial evidence that certain
employees were discharged because of union membership or organizational activities. NLRB
v. Goodyear Footwear Corp., 186 F.2d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1951). See generally Annot., 20
A.L.R.3d 403 (1968).
38. C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 542-43 (1971); see, e.g., Betts Cadillac Olds,
Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 291-92 (1951) (prevent inconvenience to customers whose automobiles
were under repair at time of strike); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907, 910 (1951)
(avoid economic loss from disruption of production at plant due to quickie strike on assembly
line); Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227, 264 (1940) (prevent seizure of plant by sitdown strike).
See generally 48 AM. JUR. 2d Labor & Labor Relations § 742 (1970).
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group in the event of a whipsaw strike. 9 Additionally, the lockout of employees as a result of their participation in unprotected concerted activities
was held not to constitute an unfair labor practice.' 0 In 1965, however, the
limited concept of a lockout as a purely defensive weapon was expanded
by the Supreme Court's decision in American Ship Building Co. v.
NLRB. " In that case, the Court examined the issue of whether an offensive
bargaining lockout was illegal per se, and held that sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) did not, in the absence of antiunion hostility, prohibit the use of a
lockout to force union acceptance of an employer's bargaining position
after a lawful bargaining impasse had been reached.'4 On the same day the
Court decided NLRB v. Brown, 3 holding that an employer may use temporary replacements to continue operations during a lockout called in response to a whipsaw strike." The Supreme Court, however, expressly re39. C. MoRRis, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 543-45 (1971); see, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278, 284 (1965); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 97 (1957); Leonard v.
NLRB, 205 F.2d 355, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1953). In his article on lockouts, Professor Bernhardt
describes a whipsaw strike as follows:
In a whipsaw strike, a union strikes one or more, but not all members of a multiemployer unit or uses a similar tactic with a group of employers with whom it bargains
individually over the same terms at the same time. Because the employers are usually
in competition with each other the struck employer will lose business to the others if
they continue to operate. The union is thus able to bring enormous pressure upon the
struck employer to settle. To prevent the union from picking them off one at a time,
the employers find it advantageous to declare a joint lockout when the union strikes
one of them.
Bernhardt, Lockouts: An Analysis of Board and Court Decisions Since Brown and American
Ship, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 211, 212 n.6 (1972).
40. See News Union v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 673, 679-80 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (lockout in response
to employee's violation of no-strike clause); NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589, 592
(5th Cir. 1950) (employee walkout). But see NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d
652, 657 (9th Cir. 1939) (lockout discriminated against hiring of workers and tenure of employment); NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1938) (lockout for employees' refusal to sign contract denying them right to bargain collectively). In Hopwood Retinning Co. the court held that participation by employees in unprotected activities does not
give the employer the right to lock them out for an entirely different reason. Id. at 100-01.
41. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
42. Id. at 310-11. Prior to American Ship, there had been a conflict among the jurisdictions on this question. Compare NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886, 894 (5th
Cir. 1962) and Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951) with
Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir. 1961)
and Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 361 U.S.
917 (1959). See also Shawe, The Regenerated Status of the Employer's Lockout: A Comment
on American Ship Building, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1124 (1966).
43. 380 U.S. 278 (1965). The Brown case involved an association of food retailers which
had bargained with the union successfully as a group in the past. In response to a whipsaw
strike, the nonstruck employers in the group declared a lockout and the entire association
continued to operate with temporary replacements. When an agreement was reached the
following month, the employers immediately released the replacements and restored the
strikers and locked out employees to their jobs. Id. at 281.
44. Id. at 284. For a discussion of the use of the lockout in subsequent cases involving
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served the question of the legality of temporary or permanent replacements
during an otherwise legitimate offensive bargaining lockout.45 Thereafter,
a divergence of opinion arose within the Board and among the appellate
courts in the area of lockouts and temporary replacements, notably with
regard to the test of whether an employer's conduct was in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) or (3). 6
Sensitive to the prejudicial effects upon concerted activities caused by
extended lockouts, the Seventh Circuit enforced the decision of the Board
in Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB,47 holding for the first time that an offensive lockout combined with temporary replacements was "inherently destructive" of employee rights and a per se violation of sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act.48 The court maintained that an employer's right to use
replacement labor was justified only as a defensive measure to prevent the
exigencies created by a pending strike. 9 Later, however, the NLRB departed from its Inland Trucking decision, and held in Ottawa Silica Co. 5
that during a lockout an employer could continue operations with temporary replacements obtained from within his own plant.'
In Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB52 the Eighth Circuit ruled that the
multi-employer units see Bernhardt, Lockouts: An Analysis of Board and Court Decisions
Since Brown and American Ship, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 211, 215 (1972).
45. American'Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 n.8 (1965); cf. NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (employer may permanently replace employees
involved in economic strike). See also Comment, Lockouts and Replacements in Bargaining-Management on the Offensive, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 67, 70 (1975).
46. See Comment, Lockouts and Replacements in Bargaining-Managementon the
Offensive, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 67, 70-71 (1975); Comment, BargainingLockouts and the Use
of Temporary Replacements: A Legitimate Employer Option, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 772,
780-81 (1974).
47. 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
48. Id. at 565; see Note 85 HARV. L. REv. 680, 680-81 (1972).
49. Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
858 (1971). Such situations would include the preservation of a multi-employer unit in the
event of a whipsaw strike, or the continuation of a business during an economic strike. Id. at
564.
50. 197 N.L.R.B. 449 (1972), enforced, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
916 (1974). In Ottawa Silica the employer locked out its employees at one of its plants and
continued with temporary replacements. Furthermore, the employer refused to award holiday
and vacation pay to locked out employees until after the parties had completed negotiations
on a new contract. Id. at 449.
51. Id. at 451. Thus, the view of the NLRB minority, which was expressly accepted by
the Seventh Circuit in Inland Trucking, was implicitly rejected by the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits. See Ottawa Silica Co. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 945, 945 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 916 (1974) (Board's decision ordered enforced in memorandum opinion); NLRB v.
Golden State Bottling Co., 401 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1965i (court suggested replacements
were legal alternative for employer).
52. 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974). Upon reaching a
bargaining impasse with the union, Inter-Collegiate Press locked out all employees in the
bargaining units represented by the union. When the union failed to agree to a contract or
no-strike commitment prior to a specified date before the company's busy season, Inter-
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combined use of a lockout with temporary replacements was not a per se
violation of employee's rights where there existed a substantial business
justification and a lack of hostility toward the union. 3 Furthermore, it
maintained that the legality of an employer's conduct during a lockout
should be determined in accordance with the standards enunciated by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,5" thus rejecting the
traditional "offensive" and "defensive" distinction.55

Great Dane AND

THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST

NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. " involved the refusal of an employer
to pay vacation benefits to employees who had gone on strike, while making no such refusal to those who had worked during the strike." While
upholding a violation of section 8(a)(3),5 the Supreme Court established
standards by which the conduct of an employer may be tested for antiunion motivation. 9 In contrast to the strict motivational test promulgated
in American Ship, where the illegality of an employer's action depended
upon evidence of hostility toward the union,"0 the Court in Great Dane
asserted that an employer may be found guilty of an unfair labor practice
without proof of antiunion animus if his conduct was "inherently destructive" of employee rights." Where the conduct possessed a "comparatively
slight" discriminatory effect, however, the Court maintained that antiunion animus must be shown to sustain an unfair labor practice if the
employer establishes that his action was justified by legitimate and substantial business reasons."2 Hence, the approach adopted in Great Dane
makes it incumbent upon the employer to establish that the reasons for
his conduct outweigh the harm inflicted upon the rights of his employees. 3
Collegiate hired temporary replacements and resumed full production. At the end of its busy
season, it offered reinstatement to its locked out employees. Id. at 843.
53. Id. at 846; see Note, 19 ViLL. L. REv. 919, 920 (1974).
54. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
55. Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 938 (1974); accord, Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 610, 615 n.11 (8th Cir. 1970);
W.G.N. of Colorado, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 n.2 (1972).
56. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
57. Id. at 27.
58. Id. at 35.

59. Id. at 34.
60. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1965); Comment,
Lockouts and Replacements in Bargaining-Managementon the Offensive, 9 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 67, 72 (1975).
61. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
62. Id. at 34. If an employer fails to show a legitimate and substantial business justification for his conduct, he can be found guilty of an unfair labor practice without proof of
antiunion animus. See Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of
American Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 81, 91 (1970).
63. See Comment, Bargaining Lockouts and the Use of Temporary Replacements: A
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A failure to meet this burden will result in the determination of an unfair
labor practice." Although the Great Dane decision primarily concerned an
alleged violation of section 8(a)(3), the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling
in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. 5 extended the Great Dane test to include the determination of alleged violations of section 8(a)(1).11
Notwithstanding the fact that the American Ship decision reserved the
question of whether an employer has the right to hire permanent replacements after an offensive lockout, 7 it has been argued persuasively that
management possesses such a right by comparing an offensive lockout to
an economic strike, where permanent replacements may be hired to facilitate the continuation of production for the duration of the strike.68 Recently the Fifth Circuit squarely faced this issue in its review of the Board's
69
decision in Johns-Manville Products Corp.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB: PERMANENT REPLACEMENT OF
LOCKED OuT EMPLOYEES

In Johns-Manville an employer engaged in the manufacture of dried felt
used as a base for asphalt roofing products was charged with violating
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by locking out employees, operating its
New Orleans plant with temporary replacements, and hiring permanent
replacements. The hiring of permanent replacements without prior notice
to the incumbent union was also alleged as a violation of section 8(a)(5).10
The company and the union commenced negotiations on a new collective
bargaining agreement on September 13, 1973, but despite several meetings
between the parties, a bargaining impasse was encountered in early October. Sabotage of the company's machinery and products during this period
caused substantial disruptions in production and endangered lives and
property. In order to exert pressure on the employees and break the existing bargaining impasse, the company elected to lay off production workers
and shut down the plant on October 31. When a contract still had not been
reached by November 14, the company submitted its final contract offer
and resumed production with temporary replacements. Subsequently,
Legitimate Employer Option, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 772, 783 (1974).
64. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967); Lane v. NLRB, 418
F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
65. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
66. Id. at 380; see Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
67. American Ship Bldg, Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 n.8 (1965); see Comment,
Lockouts and Replacements in Bargaining-Managementon the Offensive, 9 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 67, 70 (1975).
68. 7 T. KHEEL, LABoR LAW § 35.04(3), at 35-84 (1975).
69. 223 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1976), enforcement denied, 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. Id. at 1321. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
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however, it realized it could not meet the high demand for roofing materials by operating with temporary replacements. Fearing a loss of its customers, Johns-Manville hired permanent replacements without union notification in March 1974.
In affirming in their entirety the conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, the NLRB ruled that since a bargaining impasse existed in October
1973, Johns-Manville had the right to lock out its employees and replace
them temporarily to continue operations, and that such lockout was initiated for legitimate business reasons untainted by hostility toward the
union. 7 It held, however, that the company's unilateral hiring of permanent replacements without notifying the union was inherently discriminatory and destructive of the employees' protected rights in violation of section 8(a)(3).11 Furthermore, the permanent replacement of all unit employees was found to be in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5), since such
replacement completely destroyed the bargaining unit.7" Finally, the Board
asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support the employer's contention that its employees were engaged in an in-plant strike or in unprotected concerted activity so as to enable it to replace all of its production

workers .14
Relying solely on the holding in Mackay, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's decision, finding as a matter of law that the
employees at the Johns-Manville plant were engaged in an in-plant
strike.7" It therefore reasoned that the lockout and hiring of permanent
replacements by the company was not violative of sections 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the Act."6 The court further maintained that its holding precluded
the necessity of considering the issue of whether an employer can permanently replace workers following an offensive bargaining lockout."
71. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1318 (1976), enforcement denied,
557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977). Member Jenkins dissented to the finding that the employer
lawfully locked out employees and hired temporary replacements, in accord with his dissenting opinions in Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449, 452-54 (1972), enforced, 482 F.2d 945
(6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974) and Inter-Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B.
177, 179-80 (1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974). JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1318-19 (1976) (dissenting opinion), enforcement
denied, 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1317 (1976), enforcement denied,
557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 1317-18.
74. Id. at 1318. The Board stated that the evidence failed to identify any employees, or
establish that the union actually engaged in sabotage or other unprotected activities, thus
distinguishing this case from those in which there was no question as to the identity of the
employees or the concerted nature of their conduct. Id. at 1330-31; see NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 260-61 (1939); Raleigh Water Heater Mfg. Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 76, 80 (1962).
75. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1133 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. Id. at 1133.
77. Id. at 1133-34.
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In his dissent, Judge Wisdom argued that the majority decision was
"both factually and legally erroneous." 7' Observing that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that no worker had been linked
sufficiently to unprotected conduct to justify his replacement, Judge Wisdom maintained that the inference of an in-plant strike by the majority
was a mistake, and therefore that the majority's reliance on Mackay was
misplaced. 7 He also asserted that the implication of an in-plant strike was
an unprecedented erosion of section 7 rights in that it would hinder subsequent unionization and collective bargaining."0 Because he would not have
found that a strike had occurred at the Johns-Manville plant, Judge Wisdom stated that the would have confronted the question of whether management could replace locked out workers permanently," concluding that
such an action, without notice and absent a strike, amounted to a violation
of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act."
Mackay OR Great Dane: WHICH TEST IS APPROPRIATE?
Limited Judicial Review
It is the policy of the NLRA to balance the legitimate economic interests
of employers with the protected rights of employees in order to prevent
labor disputes which interfere with the flow of interstate commerce. 3 To
effectuate this national labor policy, the NLRB is charged by Congress
with the basic duty of balancing the conflicting interests of employees and
management.' Accordingly, a reviewing court must grant enforcement of
an NLRB order where the Board has acted within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority, its findings are based on substantial evidence, and the remedy it has ordered is appropriate."
Quoting NLRB v. Brown, the majority in Johns-Manville, however,
stated that as a reviewing court it was "not obliged to stand aside and
rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate congressional policy
Nevertheless, as Judge Wisdom expressed in his.dissent, the im. . * .,""
plication of an in-plant strike by the majority was contrary to substantial
78. Id. at 1135 (dissenting opinion).
79. Id. at 1139-41 (dissenting opinion).
80. Id. at 1141 (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 1142 (dissenting opinion).
82. Id. at 1149 (dissenting opinion).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1973).
84. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local
449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
85. See NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107, 112 (1955); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n,
310 U.S. 318, 342-43 (1940). See generally 48 AM. JuR. 2d Labor & Labor Relations § 1078
(1970).
86. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1132 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965)).
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precedent in support of the Board's decision.87 Not only does the ability of
an employer to infer an in-plant strike, to react with a lockout, and to
install permanent replacements exceed the limits of economic pressure
allowed by section 8, such a power inhibits the exercise of section 7 rights
and the future of collective bargaining."8 Hence, the Johns-Manville decision appears to be inconsistent with current congressional policy which
seeks to balance the legitimate business interests of management with the
exercise of protected rights by its workers. 9
Extension of the Mackay Doctrine
While Mackay has remained the undisputed position of the Board since
1935, extensions of that doctrine have not been countenanced in the past
by the Supreme Court." In Mackay the Court held that an employer's
selective replacement of union leaders was discriminatory and violative of
section 8(a)(3) Only in dictum did the Supreme Court reason that management had "the right to protect and continue [its] business" by replacing economic strikers permanently, and that it was "not bound to dis".9.."2
Furthermore, the
charge those hired to fill the place of strikers .
NLRB in Mackay had restricted its determination to the issue of discrimination, not that of replacement,93 and only in a reply brief to the Supreme
Court did the Board accept Mackay's contention that its status as a public
utility necessitated the hiring of permanent replacements to facilitate continuous and uninterrupted operations.
Whereas Mackay concerned discriminatory practices which followed a
protected economic strike, participation by employees in an in-plant
strike, such as the one alleged in Johns-Manville, has traditionally been
viewed as unprotected concerted activity.2 Furthermore, it is incumbent
upon the employer to establish by substantial evidence the identity of
employees who participated in such activity before the Mackay doctrine
87. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
88. Id. at 1141 (dissenting opinion); see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
89. Compare Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1133 (5th Cir. 1977)
(balancing of interests test precluded by implication of in-plant strike under Mackay) with
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (extension of seniority credit to strike
replacements did not out outweigh harm to workers' rights under balancing of interests test).
90. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963), rev'g, 303 F.2d 359, 364
(3d Cir. 1962); Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misno:
mer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TExAs L. REv. 378, 385 (1969).
91. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1938).
92. Id. at 345.
93. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201, 234-35 (1936).
94. See Comment, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 632 (1966).
95. Compare Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1133 (5th Cir. 1977)
with NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 261 (1939). See also cases cited
note 21 supra,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 1, Art. 10

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10: 179

can be invoked to support their permanent replacement." Without linking
a single worker to the sabotage of equipment or products in JohnsManville, however, the Fifth Circuit imputed this unprotected conduct to
the entire workforce, implied an in-plant strike, and thereby justified permanent replacement of the employees during the bargaining lockout on the
basis of Mackay.'7 In so doing, the court succeeded in tipping the delicate
balance of economic pressure in collective bargaining in favor of management. Henceforth, the Johns-Manville decision will allow an employer to
circumvent bargaining with the union through replacement of its complement of employees in the event production disruptions coincide with contractual negotiations." As a result, workers could be inhibited from exercising their right to engage in collective bargaining and unionization as
guaranteed by section 7 of the Act."9 Considering the background of the
Mackay doctrine and its past judicial interpretation, a cogent argument
can be advanced for restricting its application to economic strikes, thereby
precluding an extension of the permanent replacement rule to include
offensive bargaining lockouts.'"'
Balancing of Interests-The Better Approach
Although the Johns-Manville court based its argument for the legality
of permanent replacements on Mackay, case precedent mandates that the
guidelines promulgated in Great Dane be implemented to determine if the
replacement of locked out workers is in violation of section 8 of the Act.,"'
Traditionally, the key factor in determining the legality or illegality of a
lockout has been employer motivation."' Nevertheless, Great Dane pur96. See NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262, 268 (6th Cir. 1945); Stewart
Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 680
(1941).
97. Compare Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1140-41 (5th Cir.
1977) (dissenting opinion) with NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262, 268 (6th
Cir. 1945).
98. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
100. One commentator, arguing that the permanent replacement of economic strikers is
"inherently destructive" of employee rights under Great Dane, maintains that the Mackay
doctrine should be abrogated in the future. Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions
Concerninga Misnomer-"Protected"Concerted Activities, 47 TExAS L. REv. 378, 392 (1969);
see Comment, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 632 (1966) (calling
for reconsideration of Mackay rule in its entirety).
101. See Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); cf. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1143
(5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion) (advocating use of Great Dane test). See also Comment,
Bargaining Lockouts and the Use of Temporary Replacements: A Legitimate Employer
Option, 31 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 772, 783 (1974).
102. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1965); NLRB v.
George J. Roberts & Sons, Inc., 451 F.2d 941, 946 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers
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ports to dispense with the necessity of establishing antiunion animus in
cases of "conduct . . . 'inherently destructive' of important employee
rights. '10 3 Conversely, the Board is obligated to balance the interests in
favor of management in cases where the conduct in question is supported
by "legitimate and substantial business justifications" and its effect on
workers' rights is "comparatively slight.""'- This balancing of interests
approach entails the weighing of employer conduct and its influence upon
union activity against its importance to his economic affairs. 05 Generally,
an employer response that tends to inhibit union activity arguably serves
some legitimate business purpose, such as reducing costs or allowing management to continue business operations without interruption. 06 In pursuing a particular course of conduct, however, it is improbable that an employer differentiates between the economic advantages to be earned and
its impact on the rights of his employees.0 7 Whether an employer's legitimate business interests justify conduct which makes protected activity
costly for his workers is a matter for the Board to determine, not the
employer. 08
In Johns-Manville management asserted that it had elected to replace
the entire workforce without notice to the union, rather than end the lockout, because it feared continued disruptions in production. 00 It further
maintained that it possessed a right to exert such economic pressure upon
the union in favor of its collective bargaining position, and had a legitimate
business interest in obtaining a profit despite its difficulties with the
union." Nevertheless, it can be argued that the damage inflicted on the
workers' rights as a result of permanent replacement without notification
exceeded the Great Dane "comparatively slight" standard, giving rise to
the inference that it was motivated by antiunion animus.' If the company
Council, 434 F.2d 884, 890 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
103. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
104. Id. at 34.
105. See Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1201 (1967).
106. Id. at 1202.
107. Id. at 1202.
108. Id. at 1202. See also Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a
Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEXAS L. Rsv. 378, 391-92 (1969).
109. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1147 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
110. Id. at 1147 (dissenting opinion).
111. Id. at 1147-48 (dissenting opinion). The hiring of permanent replacements has three
principal effects on locked out employees: (1) it allows management to continue operations
during a shutdown, thus weakening the bargaining position of the union; (2) it inhibits the
union's right to strike under section 13 of the NLRA; and (3) it erodes the union's position
as bargaining agent due to the right of permanent replacements to vote in a certification
election conducted prior to the end of a strike. See Comment, Replacement of Workers During
Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 634-35 (1966). See also Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557
F.2d 1126, 1143 n.20 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 1, Art. 10

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:179

had notified the union that it was considering permanent replacements to
reduce the financial losses incurred while employing temporary substitutes, it would have evidenced a legitimate intention to pressure the union
into accepting the company's bargaining position, and thus, would have
given the union an opportunity to avoid the damage threatened by permanent replacements. "2 Without evidence of a business justification to rebut
this inference of antiunion animus, however, it would appear that under
the principles of Great Dane such conduct was motivated by hostility
toward union activity, and therefore, was in violation of sections 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act."'
CONCLUSION

Although the use of temporary replacements during an offensive bargaining lockout is lawful under the National Labor Relations Act, the
question remains as to whether the permanent replacement of locked out
employees will be permitted. Notwithstanding the fact that an employer
may hire permanent replacements under Mackay, the application of that
doctrine consistently has been restricted to the replacement of employees
engaged in an economic strike. Furthermore, the balancing test enunciated
in Great Dane as applied to an offensive bargaining lockout by an employer
would weigh heavily against permanent replacements, even though the
combined use of a lockout with temporary substitutes has been held not
to infringe upon the protected rights of employees under section 7. The
conflict between the policy of forbidding an employer to discipline its
employees for the use of economic pressure, and the policy permitting an
employer to defend his own economic interests had developed into a judicial dilemma. When faced with the opportunity, the Supreme Court
should rule on the question it reserved in American Ship, and apply the
tenets of Great Dane to the area of lockouts and permanent replacements.
Only then will a more stable environment exist to facilitate collective
bargaining between management and union.
112. See Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977)
(dissenting opinion).
113. Id. at 1148-49 (dissenting opinion); cf. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1212 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (legitimate business reasons outweighed comparatively slight impact lockout had
on employee rights). In his dissent, Judge Wisdom contended that no in-plant strike occurred
to justify the replacement of workers at the Johns-Manville plant, and that their replacement
without notification violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.
v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss1/10

16

